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A Model of Historical Thinking

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Abstract

‘Historical thinking’ has a central role in the theory and practice of history education. At a minimum, history educators must work with a model of historical thinking if they are to formulate potential progression in students’ advance through a school history curriculum, test that progression empirically, and shape instructional experiences in order to maximize that progression. Where do they look, and where should they look, in order to construct such models? Over the past several decades, three major strands have developed, one based in the empirically minded and instruction-oriented British Schools Council History Project, a second through the more philosophically oriented German field of history didactics and historical consciousness, and a third in the US. All three had roots in the historiography and philosophy of their own national traditions. Canadian history educators have been working with a pragmatic hybrid defined around six ‘historical thinking concepts.’ While this model has both been highly influential in the reform of Canadian history curricula and prompted adaptations elsewhere, there has been only minimal theoretical discussion exploring the relationship of these concepts to each other or to the three traditions which helped to shape them. This article is a contribution towards filling that gap.

Keywords: historical thinking, historical consciousness, historical literacy

Until recently, most historians and history teachers gave scant time to discussion of theories of what it is that they do. Since the 1970s, with challenges from literary theory, feminism, postcolonialism and various strains of poststructuralism, it is fair to say that the community of academic historians has variously reacted, adapted, and reformed its topics, questions, and methods: not even the most traditional of academic history departments have remained untouched by theoretical issues. History graduates are routinely expected to be able to discuss the epistemological and narrative theories that enable them to move from the archive to authorship.

School history teachers and the educators who write history curriculum and textbooks respond to a different set of demands. For more than a century, democratic states have seen a tug-of-war between political demands to use school history to promote national solidarity, and a liberal educational vision of history to promote an engaged, literate, critical citizenry. The ferment that started in the 1970s in academic history took different forms in history education over the next several decades in a...
remarkably parallel though different and relatively unconnected set of developments across national contexts (Seixas, 1993). All of them were forced to confront issues that, while related to general theories of learning, also engaged theories of historiography and historical consciousness.

In this article, I first focus on three contrasting national jurisdictions and their distinctive contributions to a coherent and pragmatic theory of history education. These three brief sketches then provide the context for a deeper look at an influential Canadian hybrid consisting of six ‘historical thinking concepts.’ This examination affords an opportunity to address some of the weaknesses that some have seen in the Canadian model, and thereby to take another step towards a coherent model of historical thinking usable in schools.

**The British Background**

The seminal reforms for the English-speaking history education world can be traced to the Schools Council History Project 13–16 (SCHP) in England, launched in 1972, and, most significantly, evaluated in a report published in 1980 (Shemilt, 1980; see also Lee, 2014). At the core of the Project was the idea that students could be active, disciplinary learners. Only if they understood the nature of the discipline—specifically, its methods for using historical evidence to make claims and its methods of explanation in the form of causal analysis—could they actually claim to know history. Rote learning would only enable them to parrot historical information fed to them by others, and they would be helpless in the face of conflicting claims. Thus, the educational project engaged one of the philosophy of history’s most basic quests.

Shemilt (1980, p. 4) invoked Hirst’s (1965) notion of a ‘form of knowledge,’ in articulating the philosophical rationale for the Project.

> If teachers accept, first, that History should contribute to adolescents’ understanding of their humanity, culture and society; and second, if they admit the desirability of teaching for rational knowledge not agglomerated belief (however ‘true’ and however useful), then the ultimate justification for teaching History at the secondary level reduces to the imperative to induct adolescents into one of the principal and most commonly used ways of making sense of experience intrinsic to western culture.

At the core of rational historical knowledge, as defined in the SCHP conception, were an understanding of the uses and limitations of various primary sources as evidence in reconstructing the past, and an understanding of cause and consequence, continuity and change and similarity and difference in historical explanation (Shemilt, 1980, p. 5). These practices were central to ‘the structure of the discipline,’ a notion drawn from and attributed to Jerome Bruner (1960).

The importance of the British work to an evolving philosophy of history education in the English-speaking world is evidenced in the theme issue of the US-based journal, *History and Theory* 12, 4 (1983), in which three of the six major contributions (by Shemilt, Martin Booth and Peter Lee) were from British authors. The decade was a fecund time for British history education research, both in continuing to elaborate the
philosophical groundwork of a conception of historical thinking, and in further developing empirical methods for studying students’ progress in the subject (e.g. Dickinson, Lee & Rogers, 1984; Portal, 1987). Christopher Portal (whose edited collection also included chapters by Shemilt, Booth and Lee) noted the widespread impact of the SCHP: ‘the time has now come to build on this foundation’ (1987, p. viii).

And build they did. Shemilt’s (1987) widely cited piece, ‘Beauty and the philosopher: Empathy in history and classroom,’ started with Collingwood in order to lay a philosophical foundation for another look at some of the SCHP Evaluation Study data. Ashby and Lee (1987), in a chapter in the Portal volume, acknowledged Shemilt’s conceptual work on empathy, but used different empirical methods to explore ‘children’s ideas about what is involved in understanding other people’s behavior in the past, as manifested in their attempts to make sense of alien institutions and actions’ (p. 63).

A list of ‘key concepts’ were cataloged and explicated for teachers in Lomas’ (1990) *Teaching and Assessing Historical Understanding*, including not only cause and consequence, continuity and change, and evidence but also ‘significance,’ and, interestingly, not ‘empathy.’ Lee and Ashby (2000) added the concept of ‘accounts’ to their next major research project (‘CHATA’) by which time their term, ‘second order’ or ‘procedural’ ideas, had emerged as the governing idea in the field. By the turn of the century, the measurement of students’ mastery of second order historical thinking concepts, was the gold standard of history education research, particularly in the UK. The challenge was to identify a hierarchy of levels for each of them, which could be used to define students’ advancement towards more powerful and defensible ideas about history.

**The German Contribution**

If the defining British contribution centers on second order concepts, the distinctive German contribution revolves around the notion of historical consciousness. This term also rose to prominence in German history didactics in the 1970s (Köbl & Konrad, 2015, p. 18). While there was no analog to the British Schools Council History Project to anchor the idea in school practice, ‘historical consciousness,’ set the German theoretical boundaries far more broadly than their British contemporaries. Briefly, historical consciousness was defined as ‘a complex interaction of interpretations of the past, perceptions of the present and expectations towards the future’ (Bracke, Flaving, Köster, & Zulsdorf-Kersting, 2014, p. 23, paraphrasing Jeismann, 1977.) For our purposes, there are three interrelated aspects of historical consciousness.

The first aspect of ‘historical consciousness’ concerns the relationship of disciplinary historical knowledge to everyday life. In Jörn Rüsen’s model of this relationship, the questions that drive historians’ work arise from contemporary issues and needs; historians then work with specialized theories and methodologies to fashion representations of the past in a variety of media; and finally those representations become available to the larger culture to help reshape contemporary issues in light of the past (Megill, 1994). So learning to ‘do history,’ in German history didactics, was never an
educational end in itself: rather its goal was ‘historical sense-making’ for the population as a whole. Second, as the term suggests, ‘historical consciousness’ calls up not only the relationship among present, past and future but also the relationship between knower and known: ‘historical consciousness’ is a subject’s historically situated orientation to the temporal world. Third, historical consciousness is expressed through narratives that embody a moral orientation.

The challenge in the German setting was to try to operationalize this philosophically elaborate notion in empirical studies, in such a way that it might inform school curriculum and assessments. Rüsen (1993), a central figure in this effort, defined four stages of historical consciousness. While it is folly for me to attempt to summarize his theory in a sentence, the stages can be expressed as progressing from ‘traditional,’ where subjects did not understand the differences between past, present and future, to ‘genetic,’ where subjects were able to learn from the actions, ideas and mores of the past, recognizing how much things had changed, yet still taking the past into account in facing the future. The strength of this model was its attention to uses of the past for orientation in the present. Yet that very strength was also a liability, in that measuring the stages of historical consciousness empirically turned out to be hugely complex.

Andreas Körber and his colleagues took a major step forward in the last decade by operationalizing ‘historical consciousness’ as a set of four dimensions of ‘historical competence,’ enabling the design of curricula and the construction of assessments (Köbl & Konrad, 2015; Körber, 2011). The first three dimensions comprise competence in historical questioning, methodology, and orientation, all working back and forth between analytical (or deconstructive) and synthetic (or constructive) aspects. The fourth dimension, not reducible to a single word, encompasses all of what the British called second order concepts, as well as the first order concepts, like ‘power,’ ‘sovereignty,’ or ‘culture,’ required for thinking about human history (Körber & Meyer-Hamme, 2015, pp. 93–95). That all of this occupies just one corner aptly expresses the model’s ambitious scope.

The American Initiatives

If Bruner’s The Process of Education (1960) had such an effect in England, it would be odd if it did not have one in the US: the ‘structure of the discipline’ indeed did have an impact on pragmatic American history educators, featured prominently in seminal works of the 1960s (Fenton, 1967). Perhaps because of the American curriculum tradition of history as a part of the subject of social studies, the ‘inquiry method,’ which seemed to apply across history and the social sciences, became a central piece of the lexicon. As an educational principle, inquiry meant that ‘learning began with something the student did rather than with something done to him or her by the teacher’ (Brown, 1996, p. 267). In history, this became the reading of primary sources, exemplified in the federally funded Amherst Project from 1960 to 1972 (Brown, 1996; Weber, 2014). Compared to Shemilt or Rüsen, the Amherst Project’s theoretical articulation grew more from a Brunerian educational stance than from a theory of history or historical consciousness. It is only a slight overstatement to say that the methods of doing history became the ends of learning history.
There is a direct line from the Amherst Project to the most vibrant history education reform projects in the US today based in the Stanford History Education Group (sheg.stanford.edu), built around the work of Sam Wineburg and his students. Wineburg’s seminal 1991 article, ‘On the reading of historical texts,’ grew out of his Stanford doctoral study, a close and careful look at how historians differed from high school students in reading various sources. The exercise he gave his subjects was drawn from What Happened on Lexington Green, written for the Amherst Project (Bennett, 1970). His articulation of what historians did as they read texts—‘sourcing’ (coining a new term, now widely accepted as part of the lexicon), contextualizing, and corroborating—provided tools for teachers to close the ‘breach’ between school and academy. Sourcing meant being aware of what the document was, who produced it and when it was produced; contextualization meant reading the document with awareness of the historical circumstances within which it was produced; and corroboration meant reading any one source in relation to other available sources.

Wineburg’s growth to preeminent stature in the American history education community over the next 20 years had a happy political coincidence with Common Core State Standards, a federal project to improve school performance especially in literacy and numeracy. Reading sources historically, the centerpiece of Wineburg’s contribution, was able to be cast as a response to political demands for a focus on literacy in schools, and large school districts, including Los Angeles, San Francisco and Baltimore embraced the project and its materials for their history classrooms (Monte-Sano, De La Paz, & Felton, 2014; Reisman, 2012; Wineburg, Martin, & Monte-Sano, 2012).

The Canadian Model

Reading backwards, it is not hard to see elements of the British, German and American contributions in the highly influential (at least in the Canadian context) framework put forward by the Historical Thinking Project (Seixas, 2009; Seixas & Morton, 2013; www.historicalthinking.ca; see also Levesque, 2008). The model of historical thinking was developed—pragmatically, like the American and British—in order to be communicable and intelligible to teachers and their students, and yet rich enough (like the German) to lead them into explorations of fundamental epistemological and ontological problems of history. The remainder of this article provides a sketch of how it did so, as well as an opportunity to look for coherence in the model where it may not have been highlighted.

The Canadian project consists of six ideas that look very much like the British notion of second order concepts, and we go so far as to call them ‘historical thinking concepts.’ They are ‘second order’ in that they are procedural: they are not, to paraphrase Peter Lee, what history is about. While they look like concepts, the reason that they are so generative is that they function, rather, as problems, tensions, or difficulties that demand comprehension, negotiation and, ultimately, an accommodation that is never a complete solution. History takes shape from efforts to work with these problems. Students’ abilities to think historically can be defined in terms of their competence in negotiating productive solutions to them.
A major component of all of the problems lies in the relationship between the knower and the known, the historian and the past, and the fact that the historian (or student) is a temporal being immersed in time, investigating and writing at a particular historical juncture, with particular lenses, questions and methods. There is no stepping outside of history in order to do history. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the first problem, that of historical significance.

**Historical Significance**

The problem of historical significance arises from the infinite, inchoate nature of the past itself. How does the historian, citizen, teacher, or student select from all the people and places, tribes and nations, ruptures and unions ... (even to use these words suggests a selection and ordering—but there’s no avoiding them) to learn, speak, and write about? How does a meaningless jumble of particulars become meaningful? What characterizes the move from that which is personally interesting to that which is historically significant? This is a crucial question for history education, specifically, because if those historical people, places, etc. are only a matter of personal interest, then there can be no rationale for history as more than entertainment or a hobby: there can be no curriculum.

Such a question arises only in a secular, post-national era. In earlier theologically or nation-building eras, a grand narrative of history gave particular events meaning, to the extent that they had a place within that narrative (Berkhofer, 1995; Novick, 1988). The splintering of coherence in recent decades, does not mean that cultures function without narratives that shape historical meaning, but rather that those narratives may be framed more about the personal, ethnic, gendered, or local identities than those of high modernity and earlier. Microhistory provides an apt example.

In such circumstances of cultural transition, what are the possibilities for the definition of historical significance for the purposes of history education? The character of the ‘antiquarian’ is of value here in explaining what is at stake. The antiquarian is interested in, perhaps fascinated by, old things simply because they are old. Perhaps a collector, perhaps a hobbyist, a history buff, there is no call for the antiquarian to tie the old things to a larger framework of meaning. In the distinction between the antiquarian and historian, we find guidance for history education. In order for a particular action by a particular person or group of people to attain significance, they still need to be linked, explicitly or implicitly, to a larger narrative. And it is the meaning of that narrative—its relevance and importance to issues that ‘we’ face today—that lends significance to its particular elements. ‘We’ is, of course, contested and fluid, depending on current identities, sometimes national, sometimes global, sometimes local, gendered, and so on.

Out of this line of thinking emerges the irresolvable tension of ‘historical significance,’ suspended between the objectivity of universally shared meanings and solipsistic enthusiasms of antiquarianism. Students learning history, therefore, should be able to articulate the narratives that may be legitimately constructed around a particular event, resonating in a larger community (see Seixas, 1997 for an empirical study). What counts as ‘legitimate’ rests on resolution of some of the other historical thinking dilemmas.
Primary Source Evidence

Sam Wineburg offers a clear set of guidelines for dealing with primary source evidence: sourcing, contextualization, corroboration, supplemented by ‘close reading’ (in the work of his student, Abby Reisman, 2012). So where is the dilemma or tension? The problem of primary source evidence is larger than the question, ‘How do I interpret sources which are sitting in front of me?’ That question assumes that sources simply appear before me to be analyzed (as well they might in a history classroom), so it misses two other key elements: first, the questions or lines of inquiry, whose answers might be provided or enriched by these sources; and second, what I already know about the context of the sources. These three elements, the text, the context, and the questions that drive the inquiry, interact dynamically (both for the historian and in the well-designed history classroom), and it is their dynamic interaction that sets up the problematic tension for primary source evidence. What is the nature of these elements?

As to text and context, the primary source, the text, relic or record that is a trace of the past time under study has been torn from its original context, and now exists, like a wild animal in a zoo, in another context altogether—our present. Moreover, like the caged beast, while it bears clues of its former context, it has changed. Just as importantly, the traces that we examine to understand the past were generally not written for posterity. They are products of day-to-day lives in the past, not as messages to us. In order to understand the meanings of the Declaration of Independence for the producers and readers in 1776, we have to read it, imaginatively, through eighteenth century eyes. In other words, we cannot read it to help understand its context unless we already understand its context.

Finally, the historical questions that drive the inquiry of the texts set up another web of problematic tension involving the relationship between past and present. These questions arise from contemporary concerns in the present, but demand to be dealt with historically: why are some nations poorer than others, what is the origin of global warming, how have race relations changed and remained the same, how was homosexuality viewed in the nineteenth century? These are not questions that would have occurred to the historical peoples who will be investigated in order to arrive at satisfactory answers for today. Thus, working with primary sources is never merely a technical problem to be guided by a few algorithms. Rather, it calls into question the complex web of relationships between past and present, and thus between the historical discipline and everyday life, which is articulated in Rüsen’s disciplinary matrix. We look to the four remaining historical thinking concepts to understand more of nature of these historical questions.

Continuity and Change

Runia (2014) makes the argument that historians go to unreasonable lengths to demonstrate the continuities of history; indeed that continuity is a fundamental epistemological assumption of the historical discipline. ‘Historians,’ he writes (p. 121), ‘are much better at establishing continuity than at explaining discontinuity.’ In the attempt to understand how one state of affairs led to another, or alternatively, to
understand the roots of one set of events in prior ones, they assume connection and continuity. But, he argues, the real world does not and did not work that way. History is discontinuous; it moves with unpredictable breaks and unforeseen catastrophes. In historians’ attempts to explain later events through earlier ones, they obscure reality. Runia’s fascinating, perplexing—and ultimately mistaken—thesis can serve as a foil for our discussion of both continuity and change, here, and cause and consequence, immediately below.

Rather than continuity’s being an underlying assumption, I believe that it is rather a key question—for historians and citizens alike: what changed and what remained the same for Black Americans after the Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, for Europeans after World War I? In each of these cases, the historian examines the (obvious) cataclysmic change, and searches for the hidden continuities. The mode of inquiry can be reversed: concepts or customs that were assumed to be continuous, are probed for change over time. Stearns and Stearns’ (Stearns & Stearns, 1985) history of emotions and Thomas Laqueur’s (2004) history of masturbation, exemplify this practice, as does Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) ironically titled Invention of Tradition. In sum, contrary to Runia, historians assume not that continuity reigned, but that continuity and change co-existed, and the puzzle is to figure out how much of each there was, for whom, in any particular period in the past.

This mode of generating large historical questions extends from continuities and changes across periods in the past, to continuities and changes between past and present, a problem that is examined below under the problem of historical perspective-taking.

Cause and Consequence

In Graham Swift’s 1992 novel, Waterland, the troubled history teacher and narrator, Tom Crick, lectures his resistant students who demand to know why they should be studying history,

Your demand for an explanation provides an explanation. Isn’t this seeking of reasons itself inevitably an historical process, since it must always work backwards from what came after to what came before? And so long as we have this itch for explanations, must we not always carry round with us this cumbersome but precious bag of clues called History? (p. 106).

Historical explanation demands working with the problem of historical causation (Braun, 2013).

The conundrum of causation arises from the question of human freedom and agency. Change over time is shaped by a complex interplay of humans acting within and against the larger social organizations in which they find themselves. Humans make history, as Marx famously wrote, but they make it under circumstances not chosen by themselves. Explaining ‘causes’ thus must include both the structures and conditions which were inherited from the past, and the freedom and choice which were at least apparently available in any particular historical moment. The more thoroughly and convincingly the historian explains how and why an event took place, the greater
the danger that human agency will disappear into an inexorable march of impersonal, mutually determining forces. The historian’s achievement is to set human decision-making in context in a way that communicates choice and intention, while accounting for historical context and conditions.

There are many ways to go wrong here, for historian, citizen, or student. Interpreting history as an iron cage sucks the energy from any attempt at action for social change or democratic participation in the present. On the other hand, overestimation of the malleability of the structures we have inherited can lead to doomed utopianisms. Many students think of change in history simply as the result of intentions of, and decisions by, individual people or personified entities (Braun, 2013; Carretero & Voss, 1994; Halldén, 1998; Reisman, 2009).

Once again, Runia (2014, pp. 106–143 and passim) forges an innovative but dangerous error, in my view, by interpreting the quintessential historical agency as undertaking a ‘sublime historical event,’ or a ‘contingent, irrational, sacrilegious’ leap into the unknown, a deliberate ‘burning of bridges.’ He accuses historians seeking rational explanations for such catastrophic events, of attempting to establish ‘continuity’ where the historical actors were deliberately but irrationally breaking with their pasts.

Whether or not a particular historical figure acted irrationally and destructively or with great consideration of her circumstances and others’ interests and values has no bearing on our ability to explain the causes of events. We can locate the causes of irrational decisions; similarly, we can identify rational motivations for actions had unintended consequences. Macmillan’s (2013) study of the causes of World War I depends for its persuasiveness in no way upon the reasonableness of the world’s leaders in the early twentieth century, and yet she shows how their frames of mind enabled decisions which led to events that none of them had envisioned.

**Historical Perspective-Taking**

‘Historical perspective-taking’ is shorthand for the impossibly difficult question of how we can understand the minds of peoples who lived in worlds so different from our own. The difficulties embedded in the question are multiple. The first is that they were not, after all, completely different from us. We can assume that pain hurt, that lack of food created hunger. Without these assumptions, we would be unable to make sense of human experience. And yet a judgment of where the boundary lies between the historically malleable and humanly universal must be assumed before the investigation that is supposed to tell us where to draw that line: another impossible conundrum.

The problem of perspective-taking is woven with each of the other concepts. The analysis of primary source evidence begins with contextualizing it in the world views of its time, so perspective-taking is hardly an operation separate from reading sources at all. A common pedagogical error comes from divorcing them, and asking students to ‘write a letter’ from an enslaved African-American or a coal-miner’s daughter, without adequate primary source evidence. It thus becomes an imaginative imposition of students’ present-day sensibilities on an imaginary past. And yet this clear error of presentism points back to an underlying inevitability of using our own, present-day lenses for our retrospective view of past times.
Perspective-taking is similarly interwoven with the problem of continuity and change. It is fundamentally one of confronting difference over time, of juggling the question of how much has changed and how much has remained the same, in the make-up of the human psyche: the framing of intentions, the sense of individuality and agency, the play of emotions, the nature of belief, the shaping of commitments and loyalties, and so on. From the sources created by people in the past, we may be able to glimpse the depth of difference between now and then, but we need to make some assumptions of continuity—even if we are ready to have them overturned—in order to begin that analysis.

Cause and consequence are implicated in the same conundrum, to the degree that people’s intentions play roles in the courses of history. We need to understand the thinking of the partisans in the Spanish Civil War, the crowds at the Bastille, no less than the mind of Hitler, or the ideas of a late-seventeenth century midwife in order to explain why change came—or did not—at particular moments in the past. Perspective-taking is also bound to the final set of problems grouped under the banner of ‘the ethical dimension’ of history.

The Ethical Dimension

Here we include (1) the problem of judging actors and actions from the past, (2) dealing with the past crimes and injustices whose legacies—either benefits and deficits—we live with today, and (3) the memorial obligations that we in the present owe to victims, heroes, or other forebears who made sacrifices from which we benefit. These issues lie well outside the purview of the British and American models, while being central issues for the Germans.

The first of these has been a thorny, but long-standing issue for historians and philosophers of history. In a thorough review of the literature, Gibson (2014) concludes that, notwithstanding classic statements that such judgments lie beyond the bounds of historians’ work, the vast preponderance of opinion now understands such judgments as unavoidable, shaping the questions that drive historical inquiry, the choice of language used by historians, and the structures of narrative accounts. Questions, language, and narrative structures are present-day tools and practices of the historian, so they bring with them the unavoidable imposition of the present on a past where people lived by ethical standards and mores different from our own. Again, the practice of history involves a nuanced negotiation between past and present.

The second aspect of the ethical dimension is more recent as a well-articulated aspect of the field of history. After the Second World War, reparations, which prior to the Holocaust had been a matter of state-to-state transfers, began to involve individuals, both as perpetrators and as victims of historical crimes (Torpey, 2006). A new mode of thinking about the responsibilities for the past spread to other cases of genocide, colonialism, slavery, and apartheid. Bevernage and Lorenz (2013) have argued that this is part of a new understanding of the boundaries among past, present, and future, a new regime of historicity, where those boundaries have actually dissolved into complex relationships.
As to the third aspect of the ethical dimension, the notion of memorial obligation as a debt to earlier generations is an old one. However, the involvement of historians is new, and arrives through the explosive growth of the new field of memory studies, exemplified—and stimulated—by the work of Nora (1996). This has forced the consideration of the relationship of memory and history. In schools, the assumption that history curriculum could unproblematically serve both educational and memorial functions is increasingly challenged. In Nora’s words, ‘We no longer celebrate the nation, but we study the nation’s celebrations’ (p. 7). In multicultural, multinational classrooms, it is hard to sustain the traditional practices of daily pledges of allegiance or songs to the Queen without irony and critique.

**Final Words**

The model of historical thinking promoted by the Historical Thinking Project and adopted across multiple provincial and territorial ministries of education in Canada has been accused of being atheoretical, of omitting attention to the interpretive nature of history, of paying insufficient attention to the dynamic interrelationship of past, present, and future captured by the concept of historical consciousness, and of drawing insufficient connection among six ‘independent’ historical thinking concepts. By seeing how these concepts are actually problems grounded in the fundamental relationship between past and present, how they draw from at least three other national traditions, and how they are deeply interwoven with each other, this article has taken a step towards a more coherent model of historical thinking appropriate as a framework for teachers and students in schools.

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

**Notes on contributor**

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